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Pascal’s wager: tracking an intended reader  
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ABSTRACT
Pascal’s wager is the name of an argument in favor of belief in God presented by Blaise Pascal 
in §233 of Thoughts. Ian Hacking (1972) pointed out that Pascal’s text involves three different 
versions of the argument. This paper proceeds from this identification, but it concerns an ex‑
amination of the rhetorical strategy realized by Pascal’s argumentation. The final form of Pascal’s 
argument is considered as a product that could be established only through a specific process of 
persuasion led with respect to an intended reader with a particular set of initial beliefs. The text 
uses insights from the pragma ‑dialectical approach to argumentation, especially the concept of 
rhetorical effectiveness of particular choices from the topical potential. The argumentation struc‑
ture of Pascal’s wager is considered to be a reflection of the anticipated course of dialogue with 
the reader critically testing the sustainability of Pascal’s standpoint “You should believe in God”. 
Based on the argumentation reconstruction of three versions of the argument, Pascal’s idea of 
opponent/audience is identified. A rhetorical analysis of the effects of his argumentative strategy 
is proposed. The analysis is based on two perspectives on Pascal’s argument: it examines the 
strategy implemented consistently by all arguments and the strategy of a formulation of different 
versions of the wager.
KEYWORDS
argumentation structure; Pascal’s wager; pragma ‑dialectics; rhetorical analysis; strategic ma‑
neuvering; topical potential
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the ‘Jednota Filozofická’ colloquium held 
at Palacký University (November 2015), and I wish to thank the audience for discussion. Also 
I wish to thank Tomáš Ondráček and anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments to an 
earlier version of this paper.
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INTRODUCTION
Pascal’s wager is an argument in favor of belief in God introduced by Blaise 
Pascal in § 233 of his Thoughts (Pascal, 2013). The examination of Pascal’s ar‑
gument was paid a lot of attention in the past, however, the analysis presented 
by Ian Hacking (1972) is currently considered as standard (e.g. Hájek, 2012; 
Jordan, 2006; Saka, 2005). Hacking identified three versions of the argument 
in Thoughts: Pascal supports belief in God gradually by the argument from 
dominance, the argument from expectation and the argument from dominat‑
ing expectation (e.g. Hacking, 1972: 187).
Pascal could certainly support the standpoint “You should believe in God”2 
by a variety of arguments or, conversely, by a single argument. However, he 
selects a specific procedure: he presents three different versions of an argu‑
ment that attempt to show that belief in God leads to the maximization of the 
reader’s utility. In a pragma ‑dialectical approach to argumentation, a specific 
choice of arguments is conceived as s trategic  maneuver ing, particularly as 
a choice from the topical potential. A speaker submitting a standpoint before 
an immediately absent opponent can choose between different argument forms 
and structures. The particularly implemented route chosen for the defense of 
a standpoint is led by an idea of the opponent and his anticipated objections. 
According to the concept of strategic maneuvering, the speaker tries to build 
the strongest possible defense by presenting (a combination of ) arguments to 
answer any (anticipated) critical reactions of the reader by a choice of argu‑
mentation schemes that seem most effective in a particular context (e.g. van 
Eemeren, 2010: 45).
In this paper, I proceed from the identification of three versions of the 
argument. The structure of argumentation is considered as a record of Pas‑
cal’s strategy of persuasion of the audience of whose beliefs Pascal has a fairly 
specific idea. The text aims to examine two questions: (1) What characteristics 
does Pascal’s intended reader have? (2) What kind of rhetorical strategies does 
Pascal use to persuade him?3
The text has the following structure. The first part briefly introduces Hack‑
ing’s analysis of Pascal’s wager (sections 1.1–1.3). In the second part, some 
2 We should interpret the standpoint “You should believe in God” as a “You should follow 
the Christian rite”. Pascal remarks: “Follow the way […], that is acting as if they believed, 
in taking consecrated water, having mass said” (Pascal, 2013: 114). By leading a virtuous 
life in accordance with the doctrine of the Church the reader can gradually come to believe. 
Nevertheless belief is conceived by Pascal as a free and undeserved gift from God (e.g. Franklin, 
1998: 110–111).
3 In the text I deliberately look away from exploring the rhetorical effects in terms of 
specific choices of linguistic expressions. I focus exclusively on the effects of specific choices of 
argumentation structures.
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insights from pragma ‑dialectics are introduced. I propose to conceive a struc‑
ture of individual arguments as a record of the implicit dialogue between the 
author and the anticipated reader (section 2.1) and as an attempt to make the 
most effective conviction of such a reader (section 2.2). On the basis of this 
proposal, I present a pragma ‑dialectical reconstruction of Pascal’s arguments 
(section 2.3). The reconstruction is in the third part conceived as a starting 
point for the analysis of topical choices with respect to the anticipated reader. 
The topical strategy is analyzed on two levels. The analysis of the general 
strategy implemented consistently by all arguments serves as the basis for the 
answer to the first question (section 3.1). Exploring the strategy of transitions 
between versions of the argument serves as the basis for the answer to the sec‑
ond question (section 3.2).
1. THREE PASCAL’S WAGERS
1.1. Argument from dominance
Ian Hacking (Hacking, 1972) identified three different versions of the wager 
that all use aspects of the decision theory. The first one is called argument 
from dominance. According to this version, the decision problem is defined 
by two possible states of the world: God exists or does not exist, and two 
alternative actions: acceptance or rejection of belief in God. If God does not 
exist, then both actions have the same outcome: in neither case we are losing 
anything (e.g. Hacking, 1972: 188). However, if God exists, then belief brings 
eternal salvation and disbelief brings damnation. The values can be observed 
in a decision matrix:
Tab. 1: Decision matrix of argument from dominance
God exists God does not exist
You believe in God (a) eternal salvation (c) you lose nothing
You do not believe in God (b) eternal damnation (d) you lose nothing
The worst possible outcome of belief in God (you lose nothing) is as good 
as the best possible outcome of disbelief (you lose nothing). Simultaneously, 
the best possible outcome of belief (eternal salvation) is far better than the 
best outcome of disbelief (you lose nothing). Thus, the utility of the wager on 
belief dominates  the utility of wager on disbelief. Rationality encourages us 
to choose the behavior that maximizes our utility, so we should choose belief 
in God.
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1.2. Argument from expectation
After advancing the first version, Pascal submits the argument from ex‑
pectation. He puts it forward as a response to the anticipated objection of 
the reader: “That is admirable. Yes, I must wager, but, may be, I stake too 
much” (Pascal, 2013: 111). This objection is raised by a reader who is not 
willing to accept that in case of God’s non ‑existence, belief and disbelief 
have the same outcome. He loses something by the acceptance of belief, 
something that he would not lose by disbelief. By the adoption of belief 
and the associated pious way of life he renounces the pleasure of worldly 
life which he highly values (e.g. Hacking, 1972: 189). In other words, the 
field (c) of the decision matrix does not represent the outcome adequately, 
it should capture some loss. It is therefore not true that the utility of belief 
dominates the utility of disbelief: the worst possible outcome of belief (you 
lose the pleasure of worldly life) is in fact worse than the best possible out‑
come of disbelief (you lose nothing).
Dominance is thus undermined and Pascal offers a formulation of the ar‑
gument that operates with probabilities and implements a strategy of maxi‑
mizing expectation. In the second version of the argument, Pascal conducts 
two revisions: the probability of God’s existence is calculated as fifty percent 
and the utility of belief in God — assuming he exists — as the infinite value 
(e.g. Hájek, 2012). If there is a fifty percent chance that God exists, we can 
calculate the expected utility of belief. If God exists, an optimal outcome 
is salvation, which is an infinite value. If God does not exist, then an op‑
timal outcome is worldly life, which is a finite value. If there is an equal 
chance of God’s existence and nonexistence, the expected utility of belief 
is greater than the expected utility of disbelief (e.g. Hacking, 1972: 189; 
Saka, 2005):
Tab. 2: Decision matrix of argument from expectation
God exists God does not exist
You believe in God (a) + infinity (c) finite value
You do not believe in God (b) – infinity (d) finite value
The expected utility of the action is calculated by multiplying the prob‑
abilities of outcomes and their consequent sum. The expected value of belief 
in God is infinite gain:
(+ infinity × ½) + (finite value × ½) = + infinity
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The expected value of disbelief is, on the contrary, infinite loss:
(– infinity × ½) + (finite value × ½) = – infinity
Rationality encourages us to choose the action with a higher expected util‑
ity and commands us again to choose belief in God.
1.3. Argument from dominating expectation
The third version is a generalization of the argument from expectation. Pas‑
cal points out that we have no reason to say that the probability of God’s exist‑
ence is just ½. Hacking called this assumption “a monstrous premise” that can 
be taken in the strongest sense only by people who are just as unsure whether 
God is as whether he is not (e.g. Hacking, 1972: 189).
To the others Pascal offers a new version of the argument in that it is not 
important how high the probability of God’s existence is. There is a nonzero 
probability that God exists: zero probability would mean his impossibility that 
has not been proven. No matter how small the probability is, the expectation as‑
sociated with belief in God dominates the expectation associated with disbelief. 
With infinite value in the field (a) if the probability of God’s existence is any 
finite positive number, then the expected utility associated with belief is infinite:
(+ infinity × (0 < ½)) + (finite value × (0 < ½)) = + infinity
It is therefore obvious that belief in God leads to the maximization of util‑
ity, we should therefore choose it.
2. ARGUMENTATION STRUCTURE FROM PRAGMA ‑DIALECTICAL 
POINT OF VIEW
2.1. Argumentation structure as a record of (anticipated)  
course of dialogue
Pragma ‑dialectics is a theoretical approach to the argumentation which began 
to be formed by Frans H. van Eemeren and Rob Grootendorst in the seven‑
ties as a combination of two perspectives on argumentation: linguistic insight 
into the function of language (i.e. pragmatics), which is connected with ele‑
ments derived from the study of critical dialogue (i.e. dialectic) (e.g. van Eeme‑
ren & Grootendorst, 1984; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1992; van Eemeren 
& Grootendorst, 2004). The starting point of this combination is the conception 
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of argumentation discourse as the exchange of verbal moves that is ideally aimed 
at resolving a difference of opinion. Pragma ‑dialectics defines argumentation as 
“verbal, social, and rational activity aimed at convincing a reasonable critic of the 
acceptability of a standpoint by putting forward a constellation of propositions 
justifying or refuting the proposition expressed in the standpoint” (van Eeme ren 
& Grootendorst, 2004: 1). This concept of argumentation is generally different 
in comparison with Hacking’s default understanding argumentation.
Hacking approaches the analysis of Pascal’s argument as a finished product. 
This approach involves analyzing the relationship between premises and con‑
clusion and leads Hacking to the verdict that all versions of the argument are 
valid in the sense that the conclusion follows from the premises (e.g. Hacking, 
1972: 190). Hacking’s approach to the evaluation of arguments corresponds 
so ‑called geometr ic  concept  of reasonableness:  the argument is considered 
valid if it is logically valid, i.e. if its conclusion is inferred from the premises 
(e.g. Toulmin, 1976: vi; van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1988: 275). Pragma‑
‑dialectics on other hand adopts as its starting point the cr it ica l  concept 
of reasonableness inspired by Popperian critical rationalism, which takes into 
account the fallibility of the human mind and elevates the concept of systematic 
critical testing in all areas of human thought and action to the guiding princi‑
ple of problem solving (e.g. van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1988: 279). From 
this position, the soundness of an argument is also conceived: the argument is 
sound if it succeeds in the procedure of systematic critical testing.
Pragma ‑dialectical approach allows us to connect the “argument ‑as‑
‑product” approach with the “argument ‑as ‑process” and conceive the final ar‑
gument as a result of the activity of persuasion and gradual removal of raised or 
anticipated objections (e.g. van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004: 1). Francisca 
Snoeck Henkemans (Snoeck Henkemans, 1997) showed that different — sim‑
ple and complex — structures of the arguments are the result of argumen‑
tative responses to different kinds of (anticipated) criticism. The standpoint 
supported by a specifically structured composition of arguments is understood 
as a record of the process in which the speaker (the protagonist) tries in the 
context of doubt or disagreement of counterparty (the antagonist) to support 
the standpoint that is further critically tested by the counterparty.
For the argument to be accepted, an antagonist has to accept its proposi‑
tional content (the truthfulness of proposition) and its justificatory force (suf‑
ficiency of proposition to support the standpoint). In the event that the accept‑
ability of the propositional content of the argument is tested, the protagonist’s 
response is a support of the argument in a subordinate  way. In the case that 
justificatory force of argument is tested, the protagonist strengthens the argu‑
ment via adding new evidence to an already submitted argument. Arguments 
support the standpoint together, i.e. coordinat ive ly. If it becomes apparent 
that an argument is potentially unsustainable, it is completed by a new attempt, 
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an independent argument branch. This step leads to mult ip le  argumentation 
structure (e.g. Snoeck Henkemans, 1997).
Tab. 3: Types of argumentation structure
Subordinative structure Coordinative structure Multiple structure
1
↑
1.1
↑
1.1.1
1
1.1a  &  1.1b
1
1.1     1.2
Considering the final form of the argument from a processual point of view, we 
are able, on the basis of the reconstruction of its structure, to identify the course 
of the anticipated dialogue. We can identify the argument which was submitted 
by the protagonist and the critical objections that were raised by the antagonist 
to critically test the argument and that led to the formulation of the argument in 
a particular way regardless of whether they were actually raised or only anticipated.
2.2. Argumentation structure as record of strategic maneuvering
In its later development, pragma ‑dialectics connects research of argumentation 
with examining rhetorical effectiveness (e.g. van Eemeren & Houtlosser, 2002; 
van Eemeren, 2010). This extension leads to a questioning of the effective‑
ness of a specific choice of arguments and their structures with regard to the 
expected antagonist/audience. While the standard model of pragma ‑dialectics 
represents argumentative schemes and specifies steps that may be used with 
respect to the type of critical objections, the extended model studies the rhe‑
torical effectiveness of choices from options thus defined. Selecting specific ar‑
gumentation schemes and their structuring is considered as the choice  f rom 
topica l  potent ia l.4
According to the extended model, the arguers in a dialogue simultaneously 
try to achieve two objectives: dialectical correctness and rhetorical effective‑
ness, and to achieve these objectives they maneuver strategically. In putting 
forward argumentation, the protagonist’s dialectical objective is identified with 
testing the acceptability of the standpoint by advancing arguments in response 
4 Pragma ‑dialectics distinguishes three aspects of strategic maneuvering: choice from 
topical potential, adaptation to demands of the audience and choice of presentational devices. 
These aspects are according to van Eemeren inseparable in argumentative practice and we 
can distinguish them only analytically (e.g. van Eemeren, 2010: 93–95). In this text I focus 
specifically on effects of choice from topical potential.
↑↑}
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to criticism expressed by (or ascribed to) the antagonist. Rhetorical objective is 
the choice of the most efficient way of support, which is achieved by articulating
[…] those (combinations of ) reasons that satisfy the antagonists and continue doing 
so until no critical doubts remain unanswered — using multiple, coordinative and 
subordinative argumentation depending on the antagonists’ (anticipated) responses 
and exploiting the argument schemes they consider most effective in the situation at 
hand (van Eemeren, 2010: 44).
I suppose that Pascal maneuvers strategically by a selection and structuring of 
his argument to convince the audience about whose set of beliefs he has a par‑
ticular idea. Compared to face ‑to ‑face communication, in the presentation of an 
argumentative text there is no direct interaction with the reader. The author ex‑
presses his point of view but the reader cannot explicitly express any doubt, criti‑
cism or opposing opinion. The consequence of this discourse is that the author 
of the text can only anticipate potential criticism of the counterparty. An arguer 
maneuvers strategically when choosing arguments and structuring them in a way 
to optimally deal precisely with those objections that are raised by the antagonist. 
From this perspective, we can say that the use of a complex argument reflects the 
idea of an audience, which raises a number of critical questions or doubts. The 
use of a simple structure reflects the idea of an audience that shares most of its 
beliefs with the arguer and does not need to test the shared assumptions critically.
2.3. Reconstruction of Pascal’s wager as a dialogue  
with the anticipated reader
Considering Pascal’s wager as a set of particular choices from a topical potential 
allows us to explore the idea of his audience and the way considered as optimal 
for the conviction of such an audience. I propose a reconstruction of three 
Pascal’s arguments in which the tools of pragma ‑dialectical analytical overview 
are used. Pragma ‑dialectical way of reconstruction captures the structure of 
the argument in a more suitable manner reflecting a process of dialogue with 
an anticipated antagonist. In order to adequately reconstruct the argument, it 
is necessary to capture a standpoint, used premises, structure of the argument 
and used argument schemes (e.g. van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004: 119).
Table 4 captures the reconstruction of arguments.5 All versions are recon‑
structed as an argument using scheme of so ‑called pragmatic argumentation. 
5 In this paper I use standard pragma ‑dialectical notation in reconstruction, where the 
arguments in subordinative structure differ in decimal levels, multiple arguments have 
different numbers on the same decimal level, coordinative arguments have the same number 
but different letters (e.g. van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2004).
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The differences identified by Hacking are reconstructed as subordinative sup‑
port of the argument. The decision matrix is reconstructed as coordinative type 
of support, the quantification of probability as antecedent capturing conditions 
of acceptability of this support. I offer a reconstruction of the opponent’s ob‑
jections that lead to a reformulation of premises in the next versions of the 
argument (premises challenged by counterargument are signified as  ‑/P). The 
different versions of premises 1.1.1/1.1.2/1.1.3 are considered as submitting 
a new attempt to defend premise 1.1, so I reconstruct them as a use of multiple 
structure.
2.4. Method of analysis
Pascal’s argumentation is fairly complex if we focus on individual arguments, 
and variable if we follow the process of their gradual replacement. The argu‑
ments have similar features: the main argument 1–1.1 and coordinative sup‑
port on level 1.1.1.1, as well as elements that are fundamentally different: in 
the presented reconstruction it is the reformulation of premise 1.1.1.
In the analysis, I use the following method. Section 3.1 is devoted to iden‑
tifying a general argumentative strategy that is implemented by all arguments. 
I identify the intended audience of the pragmatic argument (1–1.1) and rhe‑
torical effects of this topical strategy. I explore the strategy of using the deci‑
sion matrix.
Section 3.2 focuses on the differences between arguments. I examine the 
reasons that lead Pascal to the gradual reformulation of premise 1.1.1. I recon‑
struct the anticipated counterarguments and Pascal’s strategy of their removal. 
Next I examine Pascal’s argument as a complex of advancing three arguments. 
I examine the effects of rhetorical strategy of gradual advancing, removal and 
replacement of arguments.
3. TRACKING AN INTENDED READER IN THE STRUCTURE  
OF ARGUMENT
3.1. The general line of arguments
Let us mention an important step that affects Pascal’s argumentation. His 
argumentative maneuvering is preceded by a maneuver that Pascal does be‑
fore in the moment of formulation of a difference of opinion. Because there 
is not direct confrontation with readers, Pascal can choose way to present an 
initial difference of reason. Pascal presents the conflict with his opponent as 
a so ‑called single nonmixed difference of opinion. Single difference means 
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that the dispute is related to only one premise, here particularly whether the 
reader should believe in God. Nonmixed difference means that the reader does 
not hold a counter ‑standpoint, he just raises doubts regarding acceptability of 
standpoint submitted by Pascal. The definition of confrontation in this way 
gives a certain advantage to Pascal: he can focus only on justifying his own 
standpoint, he does not have to deal with the counterparty’s standpoint.
If we focus on common features of three reconstructed arguments, we can 
identify a common line followed by all arguments:
1  You should believe in God.
1.1  The belief in God leads to maximizing utility.
1.1.1  Utility of the belief in God dominates utility of the disbelief in God.
1.1.1.1  (decision matrix)
At the top ‑level there is the standpoint encouraging the reader to believe in 
God, whose acceptability is in all versions identically supported by the so ‑called 
pragmatic argument in the premise 1.1. The acceptance of this premise is then 
supported by some variant of claim about the domination of utility of belief 
over disbelief (premise 1.1.1 and its variants). Neither this premise according 
to Pascal is acceptable to the reader in itself. It is offered support in the form 
of a coordinative argument that captures the outcomes of the decision matrix 
(argument 1.1.1.1a–d and its variants). Let us deal with them one by one.
3.1.1. The pragmatic argument
All three versions of Pascal’s argument implement a pragmatic argument at 
the top ‑level. In the pragmatic argument the standpoint encourages certain 
behavior which is supported by pointing to the desired result of such behavior 
(e.g. Garssen, 1997: 21). The argument can be reconstructed as follows, where 
the premise 1.1’ is a principle which transmits acceptability from reason to the 
standpoint:
1  You should believe in God.
 1.1  The belief in God leads to maximizing utility.
 1.1’  Rationality requires realization of acts leading to maximizing utility.
The standpoint of argument is an advice: “You should believe in God”. 
Such an advice could, however, be supported by other types of argumentation. 
Why does Pascal choose this scheme for defense as the most effective defense 
to the intended reader? The answer may provide a view on Pascal’s advice in 
terms of speech act theory.
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In John Searle’s speech act theory, which is built into the very theoretical 
basis of pragma ‑dialectics (e.g. van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 1984), the advice 
is viewed as a specific speech act associated with a set of felicity conditions. 
Searle (Searle, 1969) defines conditions that guarantee that the speech act is 
not defective. In the case of Pascal’s standpoint, if all conditions of the advice 
“You should believe in God” have been met then the reaction on the reader’s 
side should be something like “OK, good idea”. But if it is expected that the 
reader is not convinced about fulfillment of some of these conditions, it is pos‑
sible to correct this mistake by advancing arguments. Felicity conditions are 
in this respect considered as indicators of possible doubts that may ever arise 
regarding the standpoint (e.g. van Poppel, 2013: 46–47).
An unfulfilled condition relevant for reader’s doubt about Pascal’s standpoint 
can be formulated as a condition of usefulness: Pascal has some reason to be‑
lieve that belief in God will benefit the reader.6 Advancing pragmatic argument 
serves to demonstrate the benefits that the reader will reach by following the 
advice in the standpoint (e.g. van Poppel, 2013: 62). Pascal presents the argu‑
ment to a reader about whom he assumes that his doubts concern the useful‑
ness of belief in God. The premise 1.1 in Pascal’s arguments is presented as an 
attempt to show that doubt on the side of the reader concerning the existence 
of benefit is needless. Selecting a pragmatic argument is therefore an optimal 
topical choice in respect to the reader who is expected to have this type of 
doubts.
Note that in all versions of the wager only the pragmatic argument is always 
chosen and it is not completed or replaced by another type of argument. From 
the choice of argument that corrects only doubt concerning one condition, we 
can deduce that Pascal does not consider that his reader doubts the fulfillment 
of the other felicity conditions. We can therefore infer that Pascal generally 
conceives his readers as people in principle willing and able to believe in God 
(and associate belief with a pious life), however, they currently do not believe 
in God and Pascal does not expect them to change this behavior of their own 
accord. Otherwise, their persuasion through pragmatic argument would be 
either pointless or superfluous.
The choice of the (right and only) pragmatic argument in favor of stand‑
point can be seen as a specific choice from many possible choices guided by 
the idea of an audience. In the absence of a counter ‑standpoint, we can say that 
Pascal presents arguments which optimally target readers who do not formulate 
their own reasons for disbelief in sense of a counter ‑standpoint “You should 
not believe in God” supported by arguments. They are not obstinate rejectors. 
Because of the expected fulfillment of other felicity conditions, moreover, we 
6 The supplemented list of felicity conditions for advice was presented by van Poppel, 
2013: 51.
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can infer that Pascal models his audience as the audience willing to follow his 
advice, if their only doubt is removed.
3.1.2. The belief as an act leading to maximizing utility
All versions of Pascal’s wager were generally identified as an argument which 
should lead the reader to accept belief based on removing his doubts about the 
usefulness of such an act:
1.1  The belief in God leads to maximizing utility.
The premise 1.1 is according to our reconstruction in all three versions 
supported subordinatively. Subordinative support is according to the pragma‑
‑dialectics suitable if the protagonist assumes that the antagonist could criti‑
cally test the propositional content of the argument (e.g. Snoeck Henkemans, 
1997: 89; van Poppel, 2013: 86). In other words, the antagonist does not 
accept the argument simply because he has doubts about the truth of the 
proposition.
In the case of a pragmatic argument the antagonist might challenge the 
normative and causal element expressed in the premise 1.1. He could express 
his doubts by raising three so ‑called critical questions that can be for our argu‑
ment formulated as follows:
1. Is maximizing utility, in fact, des i rable?
2. Does the belief in God indeed lead to the maximizing utility?
3. Are there any other factors that must  be present  together with belief 
in God to create the maximizing utility?
The topical potential therefore principally consists of three possible options 
— with regard to the expected critical question. Note that Pascal does not 
consider that his opponent would raise question no. 1 or 3. Regarding these 
elements he apparently expects agreement of his reader and does not regard it 
as necessary to prevent these critical questions argumentatively. His support 
of premise 1.1 can be conceived as a response to an anticipated question no. 2 
regarding the causal element. Specifically, he claims that belief in God rea l ly 
leads  to maximizing utility because:
1.1.1  Utility of the belief in God dominates utility of the disbelief in God.
However, it is obvious that not even this argument is regarded by Pascal 
to be acceptable to his readers without additional support. Even here, as we 
can infer from the subordinative structure, he assumes doubts concerning the 
propositional content.
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3.1.3. Shared assumptions of decision matrix
The dominance of benefits of belief over disbelief is supported in all versions of 
the decision matrix at level 1.1.1.1, which has a form of a coordinative argu‑
ment whose premises express individual outcomes of matrix. Submitting such 
an argument can again be considered as a preliminary response with respect 
to the criticism testing the acceptability of propositional content of the argu‑
ment 1.1.1. Pascal apparently assumes continuing doubt regarding the support 
of a causal element. He therefore presents an argument that on a lower level 
responds to anticipated doubt on a key element of this support: does the utility 
of belief in God dominate  the utility of disbelief? The choice of a matrix as 
an argument that implements a coordinative structure can be understood as 
a response to the anticipated doubt concerning the sufficiency of the individual 
premises to derive a conclusion.
In Pascal’s formulation of matrix we can track other indicia about the in‑
tended reader. The matrix is designed as a key part of the wager. It is located 
on the lowest level of argument and it is not supported by additional reasons. 
We can infer that the layout of the matrix and its outcomes are conceived as 
elements that the reader shares with the author and does not desire to test 
them critically. This is important because we can infer other properties of 
the intended reader from that: in the matrix they are “embedded” Christian 
assumptions of argument. In all three versions of the matrix, the possibility 
of God’s existence is associated with reward or punishment (eternal salvation/
damnation, respectively infinite gain/loss). In other words, in the matrix only 
two outcomes are considered (e.g. Archie & Archie, 2004: 174–175):
1. God exists and punishes  or  rewards as  s tated in the Bible, or
2. No God exists.
According to critics, Pascal presents a false dilemma: we do not have to accept 
that God, if he exists, will realize just reward/punishment as stated in Bible.7 
We do not know God’s qualities, so we do not have to accept that his behavior 
is precisely captured by biblical text. Nor do we have to accept the layout of the 
matrix, which is based on biblical text. From our perspective, however, the lay‑
out of the matrix serves as an indication that leads us to the interpretation that 
Pascal obviously does not want to address the reader, who would have a different 
concept of God than Christian God. For readers who do not share this basis, 
the argument is not convincing. We can therefore conclude that Pascal’s argu‑
ment is targeting such an audience that shares his particular vision of God and 
his behavior in agreement with Bible. We can specify the idea of Pascal’s reader 
7 Most of famous counterarguments (the many Gods objection, Professor’s God, perverse 
God, forgiving God, God rewarding only the chosen, possibility of reincarnation etc.) are 
directed against this assumption of wager (e.g. Hájek, 2012; Saka, 2005).
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regarding this findings: we can speculate that Pascal addresses by his argu‑
ment the reader which is currently a believer (of Christian, particularly Catholic 
confession) however ponders over giving up the belief in God or keeping the 
pious life, or the reader which is currently an unbeliever (however originally of 
Catholic confession too) and Pascal wants bring him back to the belief in God.
3.2. Dialectics of three arguments
Let us now focus on the differences of versions of Pascal’s wager. The formula‑
tion of premise 1.1.1 was identified as an element undergoing the most sig‑
nificant change. Each subsequent version is used to remove one of the failures 
of the previous versions. Let us compare the formulation of premise 1.1.1 in 
different versions arguments:
1.1.1  Utility of the belief in God dominates utility of the disbelief in God.
1.1.2  If there is ½ probability of God’s existence | the expected utility of 
the belief in God dominates the expected utility of the disbelief in God.
1.1.3  If there is nonzero probability of God’s existence | the expected utility 
of the belief in God dominates the expected utility of the disbelief in God.
Note that there are two changes in formulation: in the second and third 
version appears the formulation of expected utility and formulation of an‑
tecedent capturing the conditions under which the protagonist is willing to 
defend the acceptability of the premise. In the premise 1.1.2 it is the condi‑
tion of ½ probability of God’s existence; in the premise 1.1.3 it is nonzero 
probability.
Both changes are related, they cannot be considered separately: the degree 
of expected utility relates to considered degree of probability. Reformulation 
of premises is connected with the counterarguments that Pascal explicitly or 
implicitly ascribes to his reader. The first counterargument attacks the accept‑
ability of premise 1.1.1, the second one attacks the acceptability of antecedent 
of premise 1.1.2.
3.2.1. Transition from the dominance to the expectation
As pointed by Hacking (Hacking, 1972: 189) Pascal after the formulation of 
the first version of the argument raises a rather enigmatic objection that the 
reader could ask: perhaps he stakes too much. The objection should be recon‑
structed as an attack on the acceptability of the first version of the argument, 
in which the reader refers to the loss associated with the adoption of belief and 
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pious life. The reader challenges the acceptability of premise 1.1.1 and through 
it the sustainability of premise 1.1:
 ‑/1.1  The belief in God does not lead to maximizing utility.
 ‑/1.1.1  Utility of the belief in God does not dominate utility of the 
disbelief in God.
1.1.1.1a  If I believe in God, and God does not exists, I lose something.
1.1.1.1a.1  By the belief in God and the acceptance of a pious life 
I lose the value of worldly life.
1.1.1.1b  We have no certainty that God exists.
This reconstruction preserves the elements which Hacking highlights, 
namely the explicit premise 1.1.1.1a and its implicit support derived from the 
interpretation of pious life as a loss. Simultaneously it captures the assertion 
about the uncertainty of the existence of God necessary to ensure sufficient 
justificatory force of argument for the support of –/1.1.1. Reconstruction 
of counterargument in this way captures the concurrence of two factors on 
which premise 1.1.1 does not apply: (a) with the context of nonexistence of 
God is connected the loss and (b) there is no certainty that would exclude 
this loss.
Pascal does a remarkable step: he accepts both the points as valid, leading 
to the retraction of the original argument. He replaces it by the reformulated 
version that incorporates both factors. The objection regarding the uncertainty 
of the existence of God is formulated as an antecedent of premise 1.1.2, the 
loss associated with the nonexistence of God is reformulated as “a finite gain” in 
a decision matrix and shows that the finite gain is prevailed by the infinite gain 
in case of God’s existence. Involvement of probability calculus into argument is 
reconstructed as an antecedent of premise 1.1.2:
1.1.2  If there is ½ probability of God’s existence | the expected utility of 
the belief in God dominates the expected utility of the disbelief in God.
Note that according to this reconstruction, the protagonist chooses a re‑
formulation of the original premise, which restricts the acceptability of the 
argument by a condition: provided fulfillment of the antecedent, he commits 
to defend the premise expressed in the consequent one. Conditional premise 
according to Janne Maaike Gerlofs (Gerlofs, 2009: 126) is typically advanced 
when there is uncertainty regarding any fact. Because the discussion can con‑
tinue only if the uncertainty is withdrawn, the claim is conditionally accepted 
as correct. In the context thus formulated the discussion can continue. In our 
case, the antecedent incorporates the argument advanced by the antagonist that 
it is not certain whether God exists. Pascal’s move shows that even if we accept 
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this objection as true, it is possible to successfully defend a premise about the 
dominance of the utility of belief over the utility of disbelief.
3 .2 .2 .  Trans it ion f rom expectat ion to dominat ing expectat ion
The switch from the second to the third version can be reconstructed as a re‑
sponse to an anticipated attack to acceptability of the antecedent of premise 1.1.2:
–/1.1.2  It is not true that if the probability of God’s existence is ½ | the 
expected utility of the belief in God dominates the expected utility of the 
disbelief in God.
1.1.2.1  We have no reason to ascribe ½ probability to God’s existence.
In the case that the antagonist attacks the antecedent of the premise, it is 
expected that the protagonist withdraws the premise: it is meaningless to seek 
to maintain it if the condition does not apply. However, in some cases the 
antecedent may prove to be in a strict sense of the word false, without further 
discussion on the premise to be absurd: if we can formulate another general 
condition that extends the context of the previously strictly formulated condi‑
tion (e.g. Gerlofs, 2009: 132).
This is also a strategy that Pascal uses in the third version. He accepts 
anticipated objection but it does not lead him to retract the premise that the 
expected utility of belief dominates the expected utility of disbelief, because 
the sustainability of this premise is provided by a more general condition: any 
nonzero probability of God’s existence. In 1.1.3 only the antecedent is reformu‑
lated; claim which is formulated in the consequent one is retained in respect to 
the raised counterargument:
1.1.3  If there is nonzero probability of God’s existence | the expected utility 
of the belief in God dominates the expected utility of the disbelief in God.
The reconstruction of the antagonist’s counterarguments provides us with in‑
formation that helps to capture Pascal’s ideas about the reader more plastically: 
the reader’s high valuation of worldly life and the uncertainty of God’s existence 
can be interpreted as the reason why the reader does not believe in God. For such 
readers Pascal offers a second version of the argument, which is trying to prevent 
the objection and confirm the acceptability of the premise 1.1.1 expressed in the 
consequent one. As shown, he achieves the incorporation of both parts of the ob‑
jection into the argument. The same procedure is used in the case of the second 
objection: the attack on quantification of the probability of God’s existence is ac‑
cepted and incorporated into the antecedent of the third version of the argument.
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3.2.3 .  Strateg y of  gradual  re formulat ion of  arguments
If we examine Pascal’s wager as a complex of three arguments that are present‑
ed to the reader gradually, we can say that dialogue gradually passes through 
two conflicts of opinion regarding the acceptability of the premise 1.1.1. Pascal 
always accepts the objection which leads him to submit a new version in which 
the acceptability of the original premise 1.1.1 is conditioned by the antecedent. 
But reformulation is in fact the beginning of a new conflict of opinion. We 
may ask: why does Pascal proceed in this way, i.e. why does he present two 
failing versions of argument? Can this procedure be considered as rhetorically 
effective?
Certain answer can be found when focusing on the element that undergoes 
the greatest change in the argument. The source of the antagonist’s objec‑
tions is repeatedly the uncertainty of God’s existence. Pascal incorporates this 
uncertainty into the conditions of acceptability of 1.1.1. First he interprets the 
uncertainty about God’s existence by ½ probability, after the antagonist’s criti‑
cal objection generalizes this interpretation to any non ‑zero probability. Pascal 
does not mention any other objection afterwards, so he presents this dialogue 
as concluded by presenting the third argument — in favor of the protagonist 
as we can conclude from the reader’s anticipated retraction of his initial doubts: 
“O! your words transport me, ravish me &c” (Pascal, 2013: 114).
Generally we can paraphrase the course of dialogue concerning premise 
1.1.1 as follows. X represents the uncertainty of the existence of God expressed 
in the reader’s objection, X
1
, X
2
 represent Pascal’s interpretation of this uncer‑
tainty. X
1
 expresses fifty percent probability, X
2 
expresses non ‑zero probability:
Argument from dominance: Prot.: 1.1.1. (“Utility of the belief in God do‑ 
            minates utility of the disbelief in God”).
          Ant.: 1.1.1 does not apply, because of X. 
            (“We have not certainty that God exists”).
          Prot.: OK.
Argument from expectation: Prot.: (If X
1
, then) 1.1.1.
          Ant.: We have no reason to choose X
1
 as ap‑ 
            propriate interpretation of X.
          Prot.: OK.
Argument from dom. exp.: Prot.: (If X
2
, then) 1.1.1.
          Ant.: OK.
This schematization reveals an important feature of the dialogue: the for‑
mulation of the antagonist’s anticipated objections allows the protagonist 
to specify the conditions of the acceptability of premise 1.1.1 in a particular 
way: from a vague notion of uncertainty over its simplest interpretation (½ 
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probability) to an interpretation acceptable for a reader with little confidence in 
God’s existence (any nonzero probability). The process of specification of the 
probability during the dialogue can be considered as the protagonist’s fulfill‑
ing the dialectical objective of discussion. But can we think about fulfilling its 
rhetorical analogue?
The gradual explication of the concept of probability, which seems designed 
in regards to objections, provides Pascal with a crucial advantage. It allows him 
to formulate his own argument to make it acceptable to the widest possible 
audience: an audience with any possible certainty about the existence of God. 
Both objections that Pascal ascribes to his readers as well as the two failing 
versions of the argument serve a gradual specification of the audience.
Given that Pascal himself probably considered the latest version of the argu‑
ment as sufficiently compelling, we can say that as the audience that he wants 
to address, he considers the audience of third version. He is not interested in 
readers that believe that by pious life they lose nothing, or those who have the 
same degree of confidence in the existence and the nonexistence of God. He 
wants to reach an audience differentiated with respect to varying degrees (but 
rather small) of confidence in the existence of God. It is an audience that is 
much wider in comparison with the groups addressed by the first and second 
versions of his argument. Pascal leads his readers by the strategy of gradual 
submission of failing arguments and anticipated counterarguments to self‑
‑identify with this audience. The process of formulation of new versions of the 
argument as if in direct response to reader’s objections allows him to address 
the readers directly by the third version of the argument completely adapted 
to “their critical point of view”. In addition, consistent development of only 
one line of argument repeatedly in all three versions allows him to distract the 
readers from other possible critical objections. By dealing with only one line 
of criticism in thus presented “collaboration with readers” and not mentioning 
other possible objections in the process of submitting new versions of argu‑
ment Pascal creates an impression that the third version is acceptable because 
in the whole process there was not disagreement between him and his readers 
regarding other starting points of argument.
CONCLUSION
The paper offered a reconstruction of Pascal’s wager and its rhetorical strategy. 
The reconstruction proceeds from the identification of three different versions 
of the argument, uses insights from extended pragma ‑dialectics, especially the 
typology of argumentation structures. Pascal’s wager is considered as a set of 
specific choices from a topical potential selected with respect to an idea of audi‑
ence. We can summarize the results of our analysis as follows:
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(1) What characteristics does Pascal’s intended reader have? The analysis fo‑
cused on the structure repeatedly implemented all the arguments shows 
that the intended reader is in the position doubting (not rejecting) audi‑
ence. His doubt rests on his extreme distrust regarding the validity of 
the causal element (“The belief in God leads  to maximizing utility”), 
which manifests itself by adding subordinative support at lower levels. 
Examining the bases of the decision matrix shows that Pascal assumes 
agreement of the reader regarding the concepts of God as being behav‑
ing in accordance with traditional Christian conceptualization. From the 
above it is clear that Pascal does not try to bring unbelievers or even 
atheists to believe, but rather those who are more or less in harmony 
with Christian doctrine, but just do not put it into practice.
(2) What kind of rhetorical strategies does Pascal use to persuade him? The 
analysis shows that a gradual reformulation of the argument has several 
strategic functions: from a dialectical point of view it corrects deficiencies 
of previous versions to the objections of the readers and allows Pascal to 
specify the relevant interpretation of uncertainty of God’s existence. From 
the rhetorical point of view, Pascal opens by gradual retractions the way for 
the formulation of the third version of the argument so as to be acceptable 
to the widest possible audience: an audience with any degree of certainty 
about God’s existence. Putting forward failing versions and their revisions 
as if in collaboration with the reader and at his initiative can be considered 
as elements leading the reader to self ‑identify with this intended audience.
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